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Abstract
Background: In August 2011, the German Protection against Infection Act was amended, mandating the reporting of
healthcare associated infection (HAI) outbreak notifications by all healthcare workers in Germany via local public health
authorities and federal states to the Robert Koch Institute (RKI).
Objective: To describe the reported HAI-outbreaks and the surveillance system’s structure and capabilities.
Methods: Information on each outbreak was collected using standard paper forms and notified to RKI. Notifications were
screened daily and regularly analysed.
Results: Between November 2011 and November 2012, 1,326 paper forms notified 578 HAI-outbreaks, between 7 and 116
outbreaks per month. The main causative agent was norovirus (n = 414/578; 72%). Among the 108 outbreaks caused by
bacteria, the most frequent pathogens were Clostridium difficile (25%) Klebsiella spp. (19%) and Staphylococcus spp. (19%).
Multidrug-resistant bacteria were responsible for 54/108 (50%) bacterial outbreaks. Hospitals were affected most frequently
(485/578; 84%). Hospital outbreaks due to bacteria were mostly reported from intensive care units (ICUs) (45%), followed by
internal medicine wards (16%).
Conclusion: The mandatory HAI-outbreak surveillance system describes common outbreaks. Pathogens with a particular
high potential to cause large or severe outbreaks may be identified, enabling us to further focus research and preventive
measures. Increasing the sensitivity and reliability of the data collection further will facilitate identification of outbreaks able
to increase in size and severity, and guide specific control measures to interrupt their propagation.
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Background
Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) are among the most
common complications of hospital stays [1]. It is estimated that
HAIs are responsible for 10,000 to 15,000 fatalities per year in
Germany [2]. In a recent European point prevalence survey of
HAIs the total annual number of patients with an HAI in acute
care hospitals in Europe was estimated to be 3.2 million [3].
Studies have shown that surveillance within hospitals may lead
to a reduction of the incidence of HAI [4–8]. Furthermore, as
outbreaks of HAIs are potentially preventable, an early outbreak
detection and control may decrease morbidity, mortality and costs
[9,10].
In 2001, the German Protection against Infection Act
(Infektionsschutzgesetz, IfSG) was enacted, regulating mandatory
surveillance in Germany. An electronic surveillance system
(SurvNet@RKI) was developed to establish a national surveillance
system for notifiable diseases to support the communication of
notifications between local, federal and state institutions [11].
HAI-outbreaks were notifiable to the responsible local public
health authorities since 2001, but information on HAI-outbreaks
were generally not forwarded to the German national public
health institute, the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), and there was no
common identifier for HAI-outbreaks in SurvNet@RKI.
In August 2011, an amendment to the IfSG was passed
mandating communication of all HAI-outbreaks by all healthcare
workers in Germany via local public health authorities and federal
state authorities, to RKI, regardless of the causative pathogen or
disease. As a direct response, we developed a national HAI-
outbreak surveillance system to report the incidence, severity and
scale of all HAI-outbreaks in Germany in order to identify supra-
regional outbreaks and reduce the incidence and severity of HAI-
outbreaks.
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Objective
We describe the implementation and structure of HAI-outbreak
surveillance in Germany and present the results of the first 12
months of systematic data collection and analysis.
Methods
Definition of HAI-outbreaks
According to the IfSG, which regulates mandatory notifications,
a HAI-outbreak must be notified when two or more epidemio-
logically-linked nosocomial infections are identified. Notifications
must include information on the number of symptomatic infected
and colonised patients and fatalities.
According to IfSG, a nosocomial infection is defined as a local
or systemic reaction to a pathogen or its toxin with an
epidemiological link to any medical procedure. Colonisation is
defined as the presence of microorganisms on skin, mucous-
membranes in open wounds, in excretions or secretions, but with
no resultant adverse clinical signs or symptoms, as per the CDC/
NHSN surveillance definition of HAIs [12]. All data on fatalities
occurring in patients belonging to an HAI context of the outbreak
are transmitted. All healthcare workers in Germany must notify
the local public health authority of outbreaks meeting the HAI-
outbreak definition. The local public health authorities must
communicate the required information, and consider initiating an
outbreak investigation.
We piloted data collection on a standardised paper form prior to
implementation of the electronic surveillance system. Develop-
ment of these paper forms incorporated regular feedback from
federal public health departments and local public health
authorities. HAI-outbreak surveillance was discussed during
weekly telephone conferences and biannual meetings with federal
state authorities.
The paper form consists of 2 parts:
1. Aggregated data: number of total cases, number of colonised,
symptomatic infected and fatal cases, source, infectious agent,
multidrug resistance, transmission and institution.
2. Individual case data: clinical diagnosis, date and microbiolog-
ical diagnosis.
Only anonymous patient information is transmitted according
to IfSG.
Follow-up reports must be sent by the responsible local public
health authority to RKI whenever changes occur, e.g. case
numbers. A final notification should be communicated indicating
the end of the outbreak, also clarifying whether suspected
outbreaks could be confirmed. If there were no changes after
the initial notification, the final notification was not mandatory.
Multidrug resistance was not further defined, and so was
dependant on the results of susceptibility testing and classification
by those reporting the outbreak.
Data Entry, Data Transmission and Proceeding
Data was entered using an EpiData (http://www.epidata.dk/)
data entry mask. Two investigators screened these data to identify
duplications. Notifications (i.e. first, follow-up and termination)
belonging to a single outbreak were identified by grouping
pathogens and geographical regions. Outbreaks not meeting the
case definition were excluded. The overall reported number of
affected cases was not always identical to the sum of colonised,
symptomatic infected and fatal cases.
Standardised paper forms were sent to RKI by fax or email.
Notifications were required to be forwarded to the federal state
public health authorities no later than on the 3rd working day of
the week following the notification. Federal state authorities then
transmitted the notification to RKI within one week. At RKI,
notifications were screened daily and federal state authorities were
contacted in the case of severe outbreaks (for example, outbreaks
characterised by an unusually high number of cases or high case-
fatality, or antimicrobial resistance patterns with limited treatment
options), or a high risk of further spread, or if important data were
missing or implausible. HAI-outbreaks may also be discussed
during the weekly telephone conference organised by RKI with
the federal state authorities [13].
Ethics Statement
As a federal law, the IfSG regulates the prevention and
management of infectious diseases in humans. In order to
guarantee confidentiality, the IfSG requires that data on notified
HAI-outbreaks is reported anonymously to the national authority
(RKI).
Supra-regional Outbreaks
Supra-regional outbreaks were defined as outbreaks affecting
more than one administrative district in Germany. When supra-
regional outbreaks were reported or suspected, we contacted
federal state authorities, encouraged analysis of isolates in the
respective national reference laboratory(s) and offered further
advice and an outbreak investigation team, available upon request
by the responsible public health authorities.
Timeliness
Timeliness was estimated by subtracting the date of notification
to the local public health authority from the date the RKI received
the report.
The analysed time frame included notifications received at RKI
between November 01, 2011 and October 31, 2012.
Statistical Analysis
Descriptive data analysis was performed using STATA (Version
12; STATA Corp., TX, USA).
Feedback
Surveillance results are made available to stakeholders by the




During the first 12 months of surveillance we received 1,326
paper forms relating to 605 outbreaks. Up to 12 follow-up
notifications per outbreak were communicated per outbreak.
Twenty-seven outbreaks had to be excluded because they did not
meet the case definition (i.e. less than 2 individuals symptomatic
infected or not related to a medical procedure) therefore 578/605
outbreaks met the case definition and remained for further analysis
(Figure 1). Among these 578 outbreaks, 74% were due to viral
pathogens, 19% were due to bacteria and ,1% were due to fungi.
In 7% of outbreaks, the pathogen remained unknown (Table 1).
The number of outbreaks notified per month ranged from 7 to
116 outbreaks with a peak in February (Figure 2).
In total, there were 578 outbreaks with 8,733 cases (2–229
patients per outbreak, median: 9) including 67 fatalities (#6 per
outbreak). Bacteria were identified as the causative pathogen in
108/578 outbreaks (19%) with 609 cases (2–63 patients per
outbreak, median: 4), including 51 fatalities. Among the 108
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outbreaks caused by bacteria, frequent pathogens were: Clostridium
(C.) difficile (25%) Klebsiella spp. (19%) and Staphylococcus spp. (19%)
(Table 1).
No pathogens were identified in 38 mostly gastro-intestinal
outbreaks. These events accumulated 514 cases of which 8 were
fatal.
Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs) were identified as the
causative agent for 50% of all outbreaks caused by bacteria (n = 54
of 108) (Table 2). Among the MDROs, the most frequently
reported pathogens were Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase
(ESBL) Klebsiella (K.) pneumoniae (n = 6), Carbapenem-resistant K.
pneumoniae (n = 9), Oxacillin-resistant Staphylococcus (S) aureus
(n = 19) and ESBL Escherichia (E.) coli (n = 7). Vancomycin resistant
Enterococci (VRE) were found in two outbreaks. The antimicro-
bial sensitivity profile was not specified for 11 outbreaks reported
as due to MDROs.
Almost all HAI-outbreaks (97%) were notified by the inpatient
care setting, whereas only 1% of outbreaks were notified by the
outpatient sector (Table 3). HAI-outbreaks were mainly reported
by acute care hospitals (84% of notified outbreaks, Tables 3 and 4).
Ninety-eight outbreaks (17%) provided information about a
probable source and/or the route of transmission. Person-to-
person transmission was suspected for 82 of these; some were
further specified with details such as ‘‘having used the same
bathroom’’ (norovirus), or ‘‘lack of hand-hygiene amongst
healthcare workers and/or patients’’.
Environmental investigation identified the causative pathogen
in nine outbreaks but it was not further specified where. One
outbreak of Pseudomonas spp. infections was caused by contami-
nated water used for mouth rinse; a VRE-outbreak was associated
with gastroscopy and colonoscopy; an adenovirus outbreak
resulted from contaminated eye drops; an airborne Aspergillus
outbreak on an intensive care unit (ICU) followed construction
work and a foodborne norovirus outbreak occured at a
rehabilitation center.
One supra-regional outbreak was detected. It was a large K.
pneumoniae outbreak with cases in two different hospitals in two
different districts. The epidemiological link was the transfer of
colonised patients between hospitals.
Figure 1. Number of received notifications and their relation to outbreaks matching the case definition – Mandatory outbreak
reporting in Germany, 1 November 2011 to 31 October 2012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098100.g001
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During the study period, RKI was involved in five HAI-
outbreak investigations and provided advice via telephone on
several other occasions.
Median time to RKI-notification was 2 days (range 0–136 days)
from the time when local public health authorities were notified.
Overall data completeness ranged from 70% (‘‘date of first
diagnosis’’) to 100% (‘‘date of data transmission’’).
Discussion
We describe the systematic collection of HAI-outbreak data in
Germany during nationwide, mandatory HAI-outbreak surveil-
lance. The notification of 578 outbreaks within its first year
demonstrates that this newly established surveillance was well
accepted. Norovirus was the most commonly reported pathogen
(n = 414 outbreaks), followed by C. difficile (n = 27), Klebsiella spp.
and Staphylococcus spp. (each n=21), rotavirus, Acinetobacter and
Enterococcus (each n= 10). The surveillance system proved capable
of detecting supra-regional outbreaks: it detected one, and
subsequent investigations identified the likely transmission route.
Regional differences in outbreak incidence were identified that
were likely due to reporting bias rather than true differences in
incidence. These were discussed with regional stakeholders during
the regular teleconferences, and differences in the practical
application of the surveillance protocols were a plausible
explanation in many cases (data not shown). We plan to overcome
this through further development and distribution of the protocol,
and through provision feedback on data quality to regional
stakeholders. Hopefully, through standardizing the HAI-outbreak
surveillance we encouraged stakeholders to follow recommenda-
tions for investigations of HAI-outbreaks in Germany [15,16].
Reporting of HAI-outbreaks to local public health authorities
has been mandatory since 2001, and so we do not expect that
significant extra costs were invoked through the establishment of
this national surveillance system. An economic investigation of the
system’s impact would be a useful component of a full formal
evaluation in future.
In a systematic review of outbreak investigations published
between 1966 and 2002, Gastmeier et al. reported that S. aureus
(14.8%) caused most published outbreaks, followed by Pseudomonas
aeruginosa (8.9%), K. pneumoniae (7.1%), and Serratia marcescens (6.6%)
[17].. Published reports have a tendency for reporting exceptional
events, pathogens, and dimensions of outbreaks, whereas manda-
tory surveillance is more likely to display ‘‘reality’’ [19]. Rhinehart
et al. found norovirus (18.2%) to be the most frequent cause of
HAI-outbreaks followed by S. aureus (17.5%), Acinetobacter (13.7%),
and C. difficile (10.3%) in a survey among US infection
preventionists for the years 2008 and 2009 [18]. The relative
frequency of the pathogens responsible for HAI-outbreaks may
change over time and differ between countries. The relative
proportions of outbreak-causing pathogens identified by Rhine-
hart et al. are similar to our findings. Differences may be explained
partly by the emergence of norovirus and C. difficile as pathogens
causing HAI-outbreaks [20,21]. Furthermore Rhinehart et al only
analysed data from acute care hospitals, whereas the national
mandatory HAI surveillance system in Germany includes all
Table 1. Pathogens identified in reported HAI-outbreaks (n = 578), Germany, 1 November 2011 to 31 October 2012.
Pathogen Outbreaks Cases Colonisations
Symptomatic
Infections Fatalities
Virus norovirus 414 (96%) 7384 (11.5; 2–229) 0 7380 (11.5; 2–123) 4 (0; 0–2)
rotavirus 10 (3%) 96 (5; 3–29) 0 95 (4.5; 3–29) 1 (0; 0–1)
respiratory syncytial
virus
2 (1%) 23 (11.5; 5–18) 0 20 (10; 5–15) 3 (0–3)
influenza-A-virus 2 (1%) 26 (13; 7–19) 0 26 (13; 7–19) 0 (0)
adenovirus 2 (1%) 62 (31; 22–40) 0 62 (31; 22–40) 0 (0)
virus total 430 (100%) 7591 (11; 2–229) 0 7583 (11; 2–229) 8 (0; 0–3)
Bacteria Clostridium difficile 27 (25%) 119 (3; 2–15) 0 (0) 105 (3; 1–13) 16 (0; 0–4)
Klebsiella spp. 21 (19%) 212 (5; 2–63) 55 (0; 0–21) 85 (3; 2–15) 19 (0; 0–6)
Staphylococcus spp. 21 (19%) 102 (4; 2–15) 19 (0; 0–10) 77 (3; 1–11) 5 (0; 0–2)
Acinetobacter spp. 10 (9%) 39 (4; 2–6) 7 (0; 0–4) 31 (3; 1–5) 1 (0; 0–1)
Enterococcus spp. 10 (9%) 43 (3; 2–17) 13 (0; 0–10) 29 (2,5; 1–7) 4 (0; 0–2)
Escherichia coli 7 (7%) 19 (2; 2–5) 0 17 (2; 1–5) 2 (0; 0–1)
Serratia marcescens 4 (4%) 34 (4.5; 3–22) 15 (0.5; 0–14) 16 (3; 3–7) 2 (0.5; 0–1)
Enterobacter spp. 3 (3%) 15 (4; 2–9) 0 14 (3; 2–9) 1 (0.5; 0–1)
Stenotrophomonas spp. 3 (3%) 8 (3; 2–3) 0 (0) 8 (3; 2–3) 1 (0; 0–1)
Mycoplasma pneumoniae 1 (1%) 3 (3) 0 (0) 3 (3) 0 (0)
Pseudomonas aeruginosa 1 (1%) 15 (15) 0 (0) 15 (15) 0 (0)
bacteria total 108 (100%) 609 (4; 2–63) 109 (0; 0–21) 400 (3; 0–15) 51 (0; 0–6)
Fungi Aspergillus spp. 2 (100%) 19 (8–11) 6 13 (2–11) 0 (0)
fungi total 2 (100%) 19 (8–11) 6 13 (2–11) 0 (0)
Pathogen
unknown
total 38 (100%) 514 (2–52) 0 507 (1–52) 8 (0–6)
Median and range as min. and max. within outbreaks. Note: Numbers of colonised, symptomatic infected and fatalities may not add up to number of all cases (see
discussion). Percentages may not add up to total 100% due to rounding.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098100.t001
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healthcare settings, including long-term care facilities. In addition,
the high proportion of norovirus outbreaks may partly be
explained by norovirus surveillance in Germany, as infections
have been mandatory notifiable since 2001; and by the recent
research into nosocomial norovirus outbreaks in Germany [22,23].
C. difficile was the most frequently reported bacterial cause of
HAI-outbreaks in our dataset, also reflected in a recent European-
wide Point Prevalence Survey in acute care hospitals which
identified C. difficile being among the most prevalent HAIs in
Germany [3,24]. Also Magill et al. recently found C. difficile to be
the most common pathogen (causing 12.1% of HAIs) in a point
prevalence survey of HAIs in U.S. hospitals [25].
Fifty percent of notified bacterial HAI-outbreaks were caused by
MDROs. Selection bias may have led to an over-representation of
MDRO-related outbreaks compared to those due to non-
MDROs. Additionally, non-MDRO outbreaks are more likely to
remain undetected. For example, a cluster of three E. coli urinary
tract infections would usually not result in further investigation
whereas three urinary tract infections with E. coli with an unusual
resistance pattern would raise suspicion of an epidemiological link.
Figure 2. Monthly outbreaks – Mandatory outbreak reporting in Germany, 1 November 2011 to 31 October 2012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098100.g002
Table 2. Number of outbreaks, number of all cases, colonisations, symptomatic infections and fatalities in HAI-outbreaks due to
multidrug resistant organisms, Germany, 1 November 2011 to 31 October 2012.
Multidrug











Clostridium difficile 1 (2%) 3 (3) 0 (0) 3 (3) 0 (0)
Klebsiella spp. 15 (30%) 168 (5; 2–63) 43 (0; 0–21) 53 (3; 2–9) 18 (0; 0–6)
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 19 (35%) 85 (4; 2–11) 9 (0; 0–7) 73 (3; 1–11) 3 (0; 0–1)
Acinetobacter spp. 4 (7%) 16 (4; 3–5) 3 (0; 0–3) 12 (3.5; 1–4) 1 (0; 0–1)
Escherichia coli 7 (13%) 19 (2; 2–5) 0 (0) 17 (2; 1–5) 2 (0; 0–1)
Enterococcus spp. 5 (9%) 30 (3; 2–17) 13 (3; 0–10) 16 (3; 1–7) 4 (1; 0–2)
Serratia marcescens 2 (4%) 26 (13; 4–22) 14 (7; 0–14) 10 (5; 3–7) 1 (0.5; 0–1)
Enterobacter spp. 1 (2%) 2 (2) 0 (0) 2 (2) 0 (0)
Total 54 (100%) 349 (4; 2–63) 82 (0; 0–21) 186 (6; 1–11) 29 (0; 0–6)
Note: Numbers of colonised, symptomatic infected and fatalities may not add up to number of all cases (see discussion). Percentages may not add up to 100% due to
rounding. MRSA: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098100.t002
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The median timeliness of forwarding notification data to RKI
was within the legal time frame, although outliers were present.
Since April 20, 2013 the IfSG stipulates that notifications of
outbreaks have to be forwarded to RKI within two workdays, a
requirement already fulfilled by most public health authorities.
Despite mandatory outbreak notification we assume that many
outbreaks are not reported. This may be due to the narrow
outbreak definition on the authority side but also to a lack of
sensibility to the problem on the hospital side. In the previously
mentioned survey among infection prevention and control staff to
determine the frequency of outbreak investigations in US hospitals
Rhinehart et al. found that 386 of 822 hospitals responding to the
survey had performed outbreak investigations within the previous
24 months. [18] We received data on 485 outbreaks within 12
months from 2,045 German acute care hospitals [26]. A search
within a public outbreak database (http://www.outbreak-databa-
se.com) [19] in February 2013 among 2,908 published outbreak
reports revealed that since 2009 only three HAI-outbreaks in
Germany have been published and so entered into this database
[27–29]. To our knowledge only two additional outbreak reports
from Germany not to be found in this outbreak database were
published since 2009 [30,31]. A plausible reason for the relatively
low number of published outbreak reports can be partially
illustrated by the prosecution and high public attention following
publication of a detailed outbreak report from a neonatal and
pediatric ICU in Germany [32,33]. We hope that presentation of
the HAI-outbreak surveillance data will encourage the responsible
investigators to conduct outbreak investigations more regularly
and to publish the results more frequently. On the other hand the
low number of published investigations reveals the importance of
the information collected by the surveillance system. Healthcare
professionals may benefit from the surveillance results as they are
informed about outbreaks in other facilities or regions.
Due to several limitations, the data on colonisations, symptom-
atic infections and fatalities should be interpreted with caution. It
is likely that the number of colonised patients is underestimated as
such data can only be obtained by active screening of exposed
patients. Therefore, the true dimensions of an outbreak may not
have been always captured by the notifications. Introduction or
intensification of microbiological screening is recommended in













inpatient/outpatient care outpatient care 3 (1%) 0 0 (0%) 0 3 (1%)
inpatient care 451 (96%) 108 (100%) 54 (100%) 2 (100%) 561 (97%)
unknown 14 (3%) 0 0 (0%) 0 14 (2%)
total 468 (100%) 108 (100%) 54 (100%) 2 (100%) 578 (100%)
healthcare facility acute care hospital 382 (82%) 101 (94%) 51 (94%) 2 (100%) 485 (84%)
rehabilitation clinic 23 (5%) 3 (3%) 2 (4%) 0 26 (5%)
long term care facility 47 (10%) 3 (3%) 1 (2%) 0 50 (9%)
medical practice 3 (1%) 0 0 (0%) 0 3 (1%)
unknown/others 13 (3%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 0 14 (2%)
total 468 (100%) 108 (100%) 54 (100%) 2 (100%) 578 (100%)
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098100.t003













internal medicine ward 174 (46%) 16 (16%) 2 (4%) 0 190 (39.2%)
surgical ward 23 (6%) 12 (12%) 9 (18%) 0 35 (7.2%)
hemato-oncology ward 6 (2%) 1 (1%) 0 0 7 (1.4%)
intensive care unit 4 (1%) 45 (45%) 30 (59%) 2 (100%) 51 (10.5%)
neonatal intensive care unit 4 (1%) 9 (9%) 2 (4%) 0 13 (2.7%)
psychiatric ward 32 (8%) 0 0 0 32 (6.6%)
geriatric ward 46 (12%) 3 (3%) 1 (2%) 0 49 (10.1%)
pediatric ward 6 (2%) 1 (1%) 0 0 7 (1.4%)
more than one ward 25 (7%) 2 (2%) 2 (4%) 0 27 (5.6%)
others 62 (16%) 12 (12%) 5 (10%) 0 74 (15.3%)
Total 382 (100%) 101 (100%) 51 (100%) 2 (100%) 485 (100%)
Note: Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding. Multidrug resistant organisms (MDROs).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098100.t004
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suspected bacterial HAI-outbreaks [15,16]; routine screening is
advisable for certain patient risk groups including preterm infants
with a birth weight ,1500 g [34]. Nonetheless, differing screening
modalities, and the time between infection of the index case and
the initiation of screening activities may influence the number of
detected colonised individuals. Furthermore, control measures
such as cohort nursing and enhanced hand-hygiene may also
influence the course of an outbreak and thereby influence our
findings. Collection of information on these employed infection
prevention and control measures in the surveillance system would
enable systematic evaluation. However, the legal provisions for this
national HAI-outbreak surveillance do not make this mandatory.
A routine use of microbiological typing and molecular analysis of
outbreak causing pathogens may provide added proof of actual
outbreaks and disprove others.
Due to our definition of an HAI-outbreak, colonised cases are
further underrepresented since outbreaks with fewer than two
symptomatic infections did not have to be notified, and so did not
meet our inclusion criteria. Therefore if there were 10 colonised
cases with an epidemiological link including detection of the same
outbreak strain, they would either not be reported or excluded
from analysis.
The proportion of fatalities among cases may depend on the
susceptibility and underlying comorbidities of patients, the setting
of the outbreak, the detection of colonised individuals and the
timeliness and effectiveness of implemented measures [35,36].
Also, we identified that in a few notifications the sum of the
number of colonised cases, symptomatic infected cases and
fatalities was not equal to the total number of cases. This may
be explained by following documentation errors: 1) the number of
total cases was updated during follow-up notifications without
updating numbers of colonised, symptomatic infected and
fatalities; 2) double counting of infected cases that died as both
an symptomatic infected case and a fatality.
The information collected on the causative pathogens was
heterogeneous as it was documented in free text fields of the paper
form. Nonetheless, we present a surveillance counting HAI-
outbreaks within a country, whereas so far only estimates for HAI-
outbreak incidence have been published. The integration of HAI-
outbreak surveillance into the electronic surveillance system
(SurvNet@RKI) has now been accomplished and will improve
data-quality, as pre-defined categories replace almost all free text
fields. As increasingly reliable data will be collected in the future,
the potential of the surveillance system may be fully established,
resulting in more accurate estimates of the distribution and of the
role of single pathogens that are mainly responsible for HAI-
outbreaks, helping to target control measures. Furthermore,
reliable numbers on proportion of colonised and symptomatic
infected patients and fatalities may one day enable clinicians and
public health authorities to predict the potential severity of an
outbreak at the time of its detection.
Conclusion
Germany is among the first countries to implement a national
surveillance system for HAI-outbreaks. Systematic nationwide
data on HAI-outbreaks was not available in Germany prior to the
implementation of this system in 2011. The system was overall well
accepted. Within the first year one supra-regional outbreak was
detected by the HAI-outbreak surveillance.
The results of the mandatory HAI-outbreak surveillance system
describe the epidemiological and microbiological characteristics of
common outbreaks, which may be beneficial for local outbreak
management and control. In addition, pathogens with a high
potential to cause large outbreaks or associated with high fatality
rates may be identified in due time to establish effective prevention
programmes.
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